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A proceeding was initiated by an order directing an attorney to
appear and show cause why he should not be disbarred from practice
before the United States Federal District Court. Held, that where the
attorney corresponded with his client, who was in prison, and the letter
was intercepted by the jailor, the letter could not be made the basis for
disbarment. In re Bull, 123 F. Supp 389 (D. Nev. 1954).
No attorney has an absolute right to practice law. 'He has a
privilege only, which may be revoked whenever his conduct renders
him unfit to exercise the duties of his office.' This privilege is revoked
by a disbarment proceeding which is neither criminal or civil. 2  It is
of a summary nature3 necessarily incident to the inherent powers4 of a
court to control its officers,5 and is possessed by all courts which have
authority to admit attorneys to practice." The purpose of this action
is to protect the public and those charged with the administration of
justice, rather than to punish the attorney.7 Thus, the ultimate question
in each disbarment case seems to be whether the conduct of the attorney
shows him to be unfit either to exercise the privileges, or to be intrusted
with the duties of a member of the legal profession.8 The conduct need
not be criminal in order to support this action.9 An attorney may be
disbarred for violation of his duty to pay the courtesy and respect due
to courts of justice and judicial officers. He is required to observe this
1. In re Thatcher, 190 Fed. 969 (N.D. Ohio 1911); Wernimont v. State ex Tel.,
Little Rock Bar Ass'n, 101 Ark. 210, 142 S.W. 194 (1911); in re Clifton, 115 Fla.
168, 155 So. 324 (1934); In re Lacy, 234 Mo. App. 71, 112 S.W. 524 (1937).
2. State v. Peck, 88 Conn. 447, 91 Atl. 274 (1914).
3. State v. Finley, 30 Fla. 302, 11 So. 500 (1892).
4. Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat 529 (U.S. 1824); Gould v. State, 99 Pa. 662, 127 So.
309 (1930); In re Yablunsky, 407 II. 111, 94 N.E.2d 841 (1950); State v. Mosher,
128 Iowa 82, 103 N.W. 105 (1936); State Board of Law Examiners v. Spriggs, 61 Wyo.
70, 155 P.2d 285 (1945); see Johnson, The Inherent Powers of the Court in Regard to
Admission and Disbarment of Attorneys, 37 KY.L.J. 58(1948).
5. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (U.S. 1886); Bar Association of the City of
Boston, 212 Mass. 187, 97 N.E. 751 (1912), sec WEEIS, ATTORNEY AT LAW, 153(2d ed
1892).
6. Ex parte Robinson, 19 Val. 513 (U.S. 1873); Bradly v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335
(U.S. 1871); in re Saddler, 35 Okla. 510, 130 Pac. 906 (1913); State Bar Commission
V . Sullivan, 35 Okla. 745, 131 Pac. 703 (1912).
7. State v. Kehoc, 49 Fla. 389, 38 So. 605 (1905); Chicago Bar Association v.
Baker, 311 Ill. 66, 142 N.E. 554 (1924); Ex parte Finn. 32 Ore. 519, 52 Pac. 756 (1898).
8. In re Damron, 131 W.Va. 66, 45 S.E. 2d 741 (1947).
9. Thomas v. State, 87 Ga. App. 769 S.E. 2d 193 (1953); Willford v. State,
56 Ga. App. 840, 194 S. E. 384 (1937).
CASENOTES
duty at all times,' 0 both in" and ont12 of court, and must abstain from
insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judge personally for
his judicial acts.' 3 The rule is generally applied only to official acts, 4
but the trend is to extend it to any conduct which tends to shower
reproach upon the legal profession.10
When a case is finally adjudicated, the courts are not immune
from criticism.' An attorney does not surrender his right as a citizen
to criticize the decisions of the court in a fair and respectful manner.
He does, however, subject himself to a possibility of disbarment by
using written or spoken words reflecting unjustly on the character or
integrity of the judge. Such usage, if permitted, would bring the
system of administrating justice into disrepute.1 In a Utah case, 18
an attorney was disbarred for his slanderous attack upon the supreme
court in a funeral address over the body of one of his former clients
who had been executed. The court pointed out that the purpose of
the attorney's speech was to express his contempt and to show his
disrespect to the court, as well as to degrade it and impair its usefulness.
Courts are reluctant to exercise the disbarment power. They realize
that to do so means "excommunication." Therefore, the power should
be resorted to only when it is apparent that the interests of the com-
munity and the integrity of the courts and the profession demand it.1
That is why accusations on impulses caused by dissatisfaction, not in-
tended to be placed upon the records of the court or in any way
published, while greatly deplored, do not generally warrant suspension
10. In re Ades, 6 F. Supp. 467 (D.C. Md. 1934); In re Mitchell, 196 Ala. 430, 71
So. 467 (1916); in re Hansen, 99 Kan. 23, 160 Pac. 1141 (1916), see Sims, The
Lawyers Duty to the Judge, 11 A.B.A. JOURNAL 449 (1925 i
11. Holman v. State, 165 Ind. 513, 5 N.E. 556 (188f; In re Mains, 121 Mich.
603, 80 N.W. 714 (1899); in re Maestretti, 30 Nev. 187, 93 Pac. 1004 (1908).
12. Johnson v. State, 152 Ala. 93, 44 So. 671 (1909); In re Richeson, 64 Ariz. 85,
166 P.2d 583 (1946); People v. Green 7 Colo. 237, 3 Pac. 65 (1884); State Board of
Law Examiners v. Spriggs, 61 Wyo. 76, 155 P.2d 285 (1945).
13. In re Secombe, 19 How. 9 (U.S. 1856); In re Hanson, 99 Kan. 23, 160 Pac.
1141 (1916); In re Newbery, 76 Neb. 182, 107 N.W. 850 (1906); State Bar Commis-
sion v. Sullivan, 35 Okla. 745, 131 Pac. 703 (1912); cf. In re Troy, 43 R.I. 279, 111
Atd. 723 (1920).
14. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall 335 (U.S. 1871); People v. Green, 7 Colo. 237,3 Pac. 65 (1884).15. P eSimont v. State ex Tel. Little Rock Bar Association, 101 Ark. 210, 142 S.W.
194 (1911) In re Wills, 293 Ky. 201, 168 S.W. 2d 730 (1943); Commonwealth v. Roe,
129 Ky. 656, 112 S.W. 683 (1908); In re Erwens, 94 S.C. 414, 78 S.E. 227 (1913);
In re Damron, 131 W.Va. 66, 45 S.E. 2d 741 (1947).
16. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907); State Attorney General v.
Circuit Court of Eau Claire County, 97 Wis. 1, 72 N.W. 193 (1897).
17. In re McCowan, 175 Cal. 51, 170 Pac. 1100 (1917); In re Troy, 43 R.I. 279,
111 At]. 723 (1920); State v. Edward, 15 S.D. 383, 89 N.W. 1011 (1902); State v.
Sweetland, 3 S.D. 503, 54 N.W. 415 (1893).
18. In re Hilton, 48 Utah 172, 158 Pac. 691 (1916).
19. McGehee v. State, 182 Ark. 603, 32 S.W. 2d 308 (1930); In re Sizer, 306 Mo.
356, 267 S.W. 922 (1924); In re Reily, 75 Okla. 192, 183 Pac. 728 (1920); In to
Sitton, 72 Okla. 13, 177 Pae. 555 (1919).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
or disbarment.20  A belligerent and headstrong attitude on the part
of an attorney has been held insufficient to warrant action.21  In the
case of In Re Huppe,22 the attorney referred to the judge as "an arrogant
jackass" in a letter to a state representative. The court held that this
did not warrant disbarment, absent evidence that the attorney intended
the letter to be circulated. Likewise,23 a proper retraction or apology
will be considered in mitigating the offense, 24 and in the majority of
cases will dismiss the actionA2'  In a Nebraska case 26 the court stated,
.. .we were painfully disappointed that no apology was made."
In the principal case the letter was written for the purpose of
advising the defendant's client in regard to the taking of an appeal.
There was no intent to bring disgrace to the court.27  The letter was
written in the heat of disappointment at the outcome of the client's
trial.28  Since the defendant promptly apologized to the judge, 29 the
court rightly recognized these facts as not warranting disbarment.
It is submitted that the result achieved in this case is just and
equitable. The power to disbar is not an arbitrary one to be exercised
at the whim of the court,30 but should be used only in a clear case
for the most wcighty reasons.31  An attorney may feel at various times
that the court is biased. He may feel that the court has certain
idiosyncrasies which should be taken into account in the proceeding of
his case. The attorney should be free to discuss these factors with his





Alleging negligent damage to an interstate shipment of goods, shipper
sued carrier in a state court within the two year period prescribed by the
uniform express receipts which were in strict conformance with the
20. in re Rockmore, 127 App. Div. 499, 111 N.Y.S. 879 (1908); Matter of Man-
heim, 113 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y.S. 87 (1906).
21, People v. A'Brunswick, 315 I11, 442, 146 N.E. 483 (1925).
22. 92 Mont. 211, 11 P.2d 793 (1932).
23. See note 19, supra.
24. In re Snow, 27 Utah 278, 75 Pac. 741 (1904); In re Robemson, 48 Wash. 153,
92 Pac.929 (1907).
25. In Matter of Carrao, 170 App. Div. 545, 156 N.Y.S. 379 (1915).
26. In re Dunn, 85 Neb. 606, 124 N.W. 120, 130 (1909).
27. See note 15, supra.
28. See note 20, supra.
29. See note 24, suora.
30. People v. McCallum, 341 Ili. 579, 173 N.E. 827 (1930); In re Lemisch, 321
Pa. 110, 184 At]. 72 (1936).
31. State v. Ledbetter, 127 Okla. 85, 260 Pae. 454 (1927).
